Crisis and Non-Crisis Short Selling and Bank Enforcement Actions by Boni, Leslie et al.
California State University, Monterey Bay 
Digital Commons @ CSUMB 
College of Business Faculty Publications and 
Presentations College of Business 
11-2021 
Crisis and Non-Crisis Short Selling and Bank Enforcement Actions 
Leslie Boni 
J. Chris Leach 
Reilly S. White 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/cob_fac 
 Part of the Business Commons 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business at Digital Commons @ CSUMB. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in College of Business Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons @ CSUMB. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@csumb.edu. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 132 (2021) 106235 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Journal of Banking and Finance 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf 
Crisis and non-crisis short selling and bank enforcement actions 
Leslie Boni a , ∗, J. Chris Leach b , Reilly S. White c 
a California State University Monterey Bay, Seaside, CA, 93955, United States 
b Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado Boulder, 995 Regent Drive, Boulder, CO, United States 
c Anderson School of Management, University of New Mexico, MSC05 3090, 1 University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, 87131, United States 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 25 February 2020 
Accepted 26 June 2021 










a b s t r a c t 
Employing standard informed trading intuition, we develop testable hypotheses regarding short selling 
before and after bank enforcement action (EA) initiations. For U.S.-listed bank firm data for 2007 to 2012, 
we find strong support for differentiated short seller activity and skill in crisis versus non-crisis peri- 
ods. In financial crises, short sellers predominantly position prior to EAs. The EA initiations then act 
as information-homogenizing and profit-taking events reducing incentives to remain positioned. In con- 
trast, EAs in non-crisis periods appear to serve as wake-up calls that attract additional short selling. Our 
findings offer potentially important insights for regulators considering short sellers’ reactions to EA an- 
nouncements in general, during financial crises, and when not experiencing a broad financial crisis. 
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction 
Enforcement actions (EAs) initiated by bank regulators can re- 
main in effect for years. The most serious actions can restrict a 
bank’s growth, halt shareholder distributions, and mandate capi- 
tal raises. Some banks fail while operating under an EA. A regula- 
tor’s public disclosure of EA initiation informs not only the bank’s 
depositors but also its equity investors. Our research investigates 
whether short sellers establish positions in anticipation of EA ini- 
tiations, and whether those positions are modified in response to 
the initiations. Additionally, during financial crises, bank firm short 
selling may be elevated, even in firms never receiving an EA. Ac- 
cordingly, we are particularly interested in analyzing the nature of 
period-specific EA-related short selling. 
Prior theoretical considerations of information acquisition and 
related trading asymmetries motivate our framework for hypothe- 
ses development. 1 Conceptually, the potential for informed-trading 
profits incentivizes short sellers to undertake costly investments to 
acquire and process value-relevant information. For banking firms, 
short sellers’ investments could include the legal acquisition of 
call report data, proposed changes in regulation of the industry, 
∗ Corresponding author: California State University Monterey Bay, Seaside, CA, 
93955, United States. 
E-mail address: lboni@csumb.edu (L. Boni). 
1 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) provide the earliest equilibrium of this nature. 
and regional economic data as well as its time-consuming process- 
ing, analysis, and synthesis. 2 Our monthly aggregate short inter- 
est observations do not permit us to address the microstructural 
and broader welfare impacts of short seller positioning and ad- 
justments around the time of EAs. They do, however, allow us to 
document predictable patterns likely of interest to banks, their in- 
vestors and regulators, and to future researchers who have access 
to transaction-level data. 
A banking regulator’s EA initiation typically follows months 
of deliberations informed not only by public call report informa- 
tion and financial filings, but also by non-public information ob- 
tained from periodic on-site examinations and discussions with 
bank management. Accordingly, the months leading up to a regu- 
lator’s ultimate decision to initiate an EA offer a potentially oppor- 
tunistic time for short sellers to invest in information acquisition 
and its processing. In this vein, we expect short sellers to establish 
positions months prior to EA initiations and for the cross-sectional 
allocation of short positioning to reflect short seller skill. Data from 
our sample of 628 bank firms and 180 EAs initiated during 2007 
to 2012 confirm these expectations. Driven heavily by exposure 
in firms that eventually delist (due to bank failure or inability to 
maintain exchange requirements), short selling is abnormally high 
during the 12 months leading up to an EA initiation. Additionally, 
2 We are not suggesting that such activities extend beyond that permitted by law. 
An assumption of illegal insider trading is not necessary to motivate our hypotheses. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106235 
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and even more broadly, short seller allocation skill is evident. We 
document significant negative relationships in the cross-section of 
positions and subsequent returns. 3 
An EA announcement diminishes important informational 
asymmetry regarding the bank’s distress and its position with bank 
regulators. 4 We hypothesize that EA-related restrictions along with 
additional monitoring, higher public scrutiny, and likely diminished 
market capitalization limit future opportunities for short sellers to 
generate trading profits from additional investments in informa- 
tion asymmetry. Consistent with a hypothesis that after an initi- 
ation short sellers are more likely to shift resources to prospect- 
ing for opportunities in other bank firms, we find on average less 
short selling in firms operating with an EA than in comparable 
firms that never receive one. For some banks operating with an 
EA, however, profitable informed trading opportunities still exist. 
For such banks, short sellers likely have an incentive to maintain, 
or even increase, positioning in response to their ongoing infor- 
mation collection and analysis related to predicting extreme neg- 
ative outcomes. About 40% (73) of the 180 EA firms in our sam- 
ple appear to be likely candidates for sustained or increased short 
selling. These firms, while operating with an EA, ultimately delist 
when their bank(s) fail or when they are unable to maintain their 
U.S. exchange’s minimum listing requirements (e.g., equity price of 
at least a dollar per share). Interestingly, however, delisting firms 
avoid EA-related profit taking’s diminished positioning (on aver- 
age) only when we restrict attention to firms having sufficiently 
high remaining post-announcement market cap. Even there, post- 
announcement positioning increases are insignificant. Overall, for 
our sample of 180 firms receiving an EA in 2007 to 2012, we find 
strong support for the hypothesis that EAs have a relevant informa- 
tion homogenization effect. In reducing short sellers’ incentives to 
remain positioned, EAs serve as a significant opportunity for profit- 
taking. Still, subsequent to EAs, remaining abnormal short selling 
and subsequent returns generally perpetuate a skill-related nega- 
tive relationship. 
We next examine whether analyzing the 2007 to 2012 period 
overall masks differentiated short selling activity in crisis and non- 
crisis periods. During financial crises, more bank firms are likely 
to experience distress and extreme negative outcomes (e.g., bank 
failure and insolvency). We hypothesize that this creates more in- 
centivizes for short sellers to identify and initiate short positions 
prior to EA initiations in a financial crisis than in a non-crisis pe- 
riod. It also creates greater incentives to take profits and reduce 
positions once an EA is initiated. The EAs’ information homoge- 
nizing effect suggests that short sellers may be better off rede- 
ploying their human and financial capital towards prospecting for 
pre-EA firms. In contrast, in non-crisis times, we hypothesize that 
short sellers in general expend fewer resources analyzing banking 
firms. Rather than inducing profit-taking, EA initiations may then 
act as a wake-up call (i.e., impose a “fear of missing out”). If so, 
EAs may attract additional short sellers’ financial and human capi- 
tal (compared to similar firms not operating with an EA) to ferret 
out those firms that are over-valued and might experience extreme 
outcomes. 
For our crisis versus non-crisis analyses, we define 2007 to 
2009 as the crisis period and 2010 to 2012 as the non-crisis 
3 Consistent with others (e.g., Karpoff and Lou, 2010 ), we proxy for short seller 
skill as a negative relationship between monthly short interest and subsequent 
month return. 
4 As we discuss in the Internet Appendix, the regulator “announces” (publishes 
on its website) the initiation of the EA almost immediately. Given the periodicity of 
our monthly short interest data, we treat EA initiation and EA announcement as the 
same date and use EA initiation and EA announcement interchangeably throughout 
the paper. 
period. 5 Our results provide strong support for our hypotheses 
of crisis versus non-crisis differentiation in short selling behav- 
ior around EAs. Prior to EA initiations, short selling is abnormally 
high (low) in the crisis (non-crisis) period. Following EA initiations, 
short selling positions decrease during the crisis but increase in the 
non-crisis period. EA initiations incent divestment (profit-taking) 
during a crisis but incent investment (increased short positioning) 
during non-crisis times. We conclude that analyzing the 2007 to 
2012 period as a whole without controlling for differentiation in 
the crisis and non-crisis periods, can lead to misleading inferences. 
We also develop and test hypotheses of differentiated short 
selling skill in crisis versus non-crisis periods. Given our conceptual 
framework where informed-trading profits arise from prior costly 
investments in information and analysis, we maintain a focus on 
short sellers’ skill in deriving profit from the expertise thereby ac- 
quired, i.e., cross-sectional allocation skill. For pre-EA positioning, 
we find robust evidence of short seller skill in both the crisis and 
non-crisis periods, but at a significantly attenuated level during a 
crisis. For positioning in firms operating with an EA that eventually 
survive the EA (i.e., do not fail or delist), we find evidence of sig- 
nificant cross-sectional allocation skill in the non-crisis period but 
much less in the crisis. 
For non-crisis post-announcement delister positioning, however, 
in contrast to the usual skill-related negative relationship, we ob- 
serve some incidence of positive (negatively skilled) relationships 
between positioning and subsequent return. Given the potential 
for inverted realized skill in non-crisis times, it need not follow 
that a crisis would be expected to result in even larger magnitudes 
for an inverted skill-related relationship. Indeed, our crisis post- 
announcement delister sample exhibits the usual negative relation- 
ship. The notable departure in non-crisis times coincides, likely not 
coincidentally, with the aforementioned influx of “awakened” ad- 
ditional post-announcement short seller positioning in non-crisis 
delisters. Some of that post-announcement positioning appears to 
be spectacularly wrongly allocated in the cross-section of delisters. 
Such a finding suggests that while post-announcement bank short 
sellers “awakened” by EAs in non-crisis times may benefit on av- 
erage as prices decline on the road to delisting, a long-short hedge 
fund across non-crisis “known” delisters could invite spectacular 
failure. 
Our findings have potential import for regulators concerned 
about differential reactions of short sellers to EA announcements in 
general, during financial crises, and when not experiencing a broad 
financial crisis. A growing literature concludes that short sellers are 
informed traders. During the financial crisis, short sellers detected 
firms with exposure to risky assets ( Hasan et al., 2015 ), prior to 
write-downs ( Liu et al., 2012 ), and earlier than accountants or ana- 
lysts ( Desai et al., 2016 ). Balasubramnian and Palvia (2018) analyze 
OCC-regulated firms and propriety supervisory ratings (CAMELS) 
for 2004 to 2012 and conclude short sellers provide early signals 
of financial distress. 
Perhaps most relevant to our work, Berger et al. (2021) find that 
EAs are effective in reducing systemic risk (impacting bank lever- 
age and portfolio risk) and have greater impact during financial 
crises than in normal times. Our finding that EAs correlate with a 
reduction in crisis-era short selling adds another reason why crisis- 
era EAs may attenuate, rather than exacerbate, systemic risk. To 
our knowledge, our investigation is the first to analyze the rela- 
tionship between EAs and short sellers’ positioning and potential 
profits in crisis and non-crisis periods. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the 
EA event timeline and partition of crisis and non-crisis pe- 
5 We use the end of 2009 as the break between periods as in Berger and Bouw- 
man (2013) . 
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Fig. 1. Timeline of the enforcement action (EA) event. As shown in the timeline, some firms receive multiple formal EAs. As discussed in Section 2.1 , we use the initiation 
of the first formal EA the firm receives as the “EA initiation event”. 
riods. Section 3 provides the related hypotheses development. 
Section 4 describes our banking firm sample and empirical find- 
ings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Event timelines 
2.1. Enforcement action (EA) events 
Fig. 1 displays the timeline for EA events. Prior studies of banks 
and bank regulators conclude that regulators may use the most 
severe types of EAs (prompt corrective actions, cease and desist 
orders, formal agreements and written agreements) as a last re- 
sort. As a result, the firm’s financial condition can deteriorate sub- 
stantially prior to the initiation ( Delis et al., 2017 ). As described in 
Section 4.1 , our analysis examines these most severe types of EAs. 
While operating under an EA, the firm or its bank(s) may receive 
additional EAs. Many firms “survive” the EAs, which we define as 
regulators’ termination of all EAs while the firm’s equity remains 
listed. Other firms are acquired while operating with at least one 
EA, delist concurrent with bank failure(s), or delist for other rea- 
sons (such as the inability to continue to meet minimum listing 
requirements) while still operating under at least one EA. 
As shown in Fig. 1 , firms can receive multiple EAs. We define 
the earliest initiation as the EA initiation event. For example, on 
Sept. 15, 2009, Tamalpais Bancorp, a bank holding company, re- 
ceived its earliest initiation, which was an FDIC cease & desist or- 
der for its bank. Subsequent events (while the firm operated with 
the FDIC C&D order) were a Jan. 2010 FRB written agreement ini- 
tiation with the holding company and a Feb. 2010 FDIC escalation 
action (prompt corrective action proscriptions on the bank). The 
bank failed and the holding company delisted in Apr. 2010. We de- 
fine Sept. 15, 2009, as the EA initiation event for our analyses. 
2.2. Crisis and non-crisis periods 
Fig. 2 (upper panel) shows our sample of 180 unique firms par- 
titioned by EA initiation event for each calendar quarter in the cri- 
sis (2007 – 2009) and non-crisis (2010 – 2012) periods. We break 
Fig. 2. Calendar time of enforcement action (EA) initiation events and return 
indices. The upper panel shows the number of firms that receive an EA initia- 
tion per calendar quarter in the crisis and non-crisis periods. The lower panel re- 
ports the buy-and-hold return for each of four equity indices purchased at the end 
of 2006. The indices are constructed from CRSP value-weighted (v.w.), and equal- 
weighted (e.w.) returns and value-weighed and equal-weighted returns for the 628 
bank-firm sample (Bank v.w. and Bank e.w.). 
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crisis and non-crisis at the end of 2009 as in Berger and Bouw- 
man (2013) , who note that by the first quarter of 2010, many fi- 
nancial institutions had repaid TARP money. The lower panel of 
Fig. 2 shows buy-and-hold returns for CRSP and bank firm value- 
weighted and equal-weighted indices. We construct the bank in- 
dices using our 628 bank-firm sample described in Section 4.1 that 
includes the 180 firms that receive an EA and all other publicly- 
traded bank firms that do not. Both CRSP indices and the bank 
value-weighted index recover sharply starting in second quarter 
2009. 
3. Hypotheses development 
In this section, we develop testable hypotheses regarding bank 
equity short selling prior to, and following, enforcement action 
(EA) initiations in general, and for differentiations related to crisis 
and non-crisis periods. 
3.1. Short selling prior to EA initiations 
Supervisory ratings downgrades frequently precede EAs 
(e.g., Brunmeier and Willardson, 2006 ). Combined with 
Balasubramnian and Palvia’s (2018) finding of increased short 
selling around downgrades, there is significant support for the 
premise that short sellers frequently establish positions prior to 
EA initiations. We carry that premise forward into our inquiry. 
H1: In the months prior to the EA, a banking firm’s short inter- 
est is abnormally high. 
Some firms experience negative price momentum prior to EA 
initiations. 6 Thus, one would expect skilled short seller positions 
established prior to EA initiations to precede subsequent negative 
returns. Such a finding, however, could merely reflect look-ahead 
bias created by requiring the subsample of banking firms to expe- 
rience a future EA. A broader literature, not specific to banks, but 
similarly exposed to look-ahead bias, documents profitable pre- 
negative-event short selling. Regarding short seller skill, however, 
that literature suggests that at least some short sellers are skilled 
fundamental analysts who detect mispriced firms more generally 
than just preceding a subsequently-identifiable negative event (like 
an EA). 7 We adopt a more demanding notion that short seller skill 
be exhibited through cross-sectional selectivity in the subset of 
firms that subsequently experience EAs. 8 That is, it is reasonable 
to conjecture that skilled short sellers tilt their positioning toward 
(i.e., establish larger positions in) banks that will subsequently ex- 
perience more negative price revisions by the dates of their EA ini- 
tiations. 
H2: In the months prior to an EA, a banking firm’s abnormal 
short interest is negatively related to subsequent returns. 
3.2. Short selling after EA initiations 
To a great extent, we merely inherited H1 and H2 from prior 
empirical research on short selling in other contexts. That said, 
6 For example, see Jordan et al., (20 0 0) . 
7 Examples, not specific to banking, include Akbas et al., (2017) , Henry et al., 
(2015) , and Karpoff and Lou (2010) . 
8 Framing selectivity and/or market timing skill as a beneficial covariance be- 
tween asset allocation weights and subsequent returns appears in many contexts, 
including its early motivation in Grinblatt and Titman (1989) . We do not observe 
a short-seller’s total portfolio returns, nor the costs related to that portfolio. Here 
we consider only the distribution of the magnitudes of short positions in EA banks, 
thus the characterization of this hypothesis as “selectivity” across banks rather than 
“timing” for a given bank. 
general theoretical notions regarding informed traders who in- 
vest in information, analysis and expertise to subsequently gain 
from trading motivate H1 and H2 . They also motivate an inquiry 
into the nature of short seller positioning and skill after EA an- 
nouncements. 9 Once an EA is initiated, equity price adjusts to re- 
flect public expectations for the bank’s future operations under the 
publicly-announced EA. 10 Even though its main objective is influ- 
encing the firm’s available actions, the EA’s announcement typi- 
cally leads to more homogenized information. When the EA is per- 
ceived as negative news, the result is lower equity trading prices 
and therefore market cap. Accordingly, short sellers’ incentives to 
invest additional financial and human capital to create additional 
post-announcement information or analytic advantage can be sig- 
nificantly diminished by EA announcements. This, in turn, leads 
to EA-related profit-taking and de-positioning. A possible excep- 
tion is for banks having sufficient remaining market cap after the 
announcement but eventually failing. For contexts including such 
banks, additional short seller investment in asymmetric informa- 
tion or analysis to differentiate amongst banks operating with an 
EA could provide an opportunity for additional short seller trad- 
ing profits. Following EA announcements, we considered outcome- 
contingent differentiations: 
H3 Survives : For banking firms that survive subsequent to operat- 
ing under an EA, abnormal short interest decreases from its 
pre-EA level. 
H3 Delists : For banking firms that delist while operating under 
an EA, abnormal short interest may increase, decrease or not 
change depending on the context. 
The EA-induced repricing and diminished asymmetry may elim- 
inate many of short sellers’ opportunities to invest in, and benefit 
from, the creation of new trading advantages. For those short sell- 
ers who do invest, however, we would expect cross-sectional allo- 
cation skill to continue to exhibit itself analogously to the pre-EA 
period. 
H4: For banking firms operating under an EA, abnormal short 
interest following an EA is negatively related to subsequent 
returns. 
3.3. Short selling in financial crisis versus non-crisis periods 
Returning to our theoretical motivation for costly short seller 
investment in creating information or analytic skill trading advan- 
tages, during financial crises banks on average may be more likely 
to experience extreme negative outcomes (e.g., bank failure) than 
in non-crisis periods. The potential for bank failures could there- 
fore offer a higher-than-normal aggregate profit opportunity for 
short sellers active in a financial crisis. Accordingly, other things 
being equal (including the supply of capital for short selling), short 
sellers might be expected to invest more heavily in producing 
asymmetry from which to profit during the crisis. This leads us to 
9 In a Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) style competitive information acquisition 
equilibrium, everyone has access to the same information technology and makes 
only enough profits to offset the cost of their individual investment. We do not 
need that competitive equilibrium assumption to motivate the basic idea that trad- 
ing profits will likely be high when short sellers can spend to become asymmetri- 
cally informed or talented in analysis. Indeed, we would arrive at the same nega- 
tive relationship between abnormal short selling and future abnormal returns with 
a single trader having a monopolistic right to spend to become asymmetrically in- 
formed or advantaged in analysis. 
10 Studies by Brous and Leggett (1996) , Slovin et al. (1999) , and 
Jordan et al. (20 0 0) document a negative market reaction to EA initiations. 
Gilbert and Vaughan (2001) conclude depositors do not react negatively to EA 
disclosures. Roman (2020) finds stock price declines for the bank’s relationship 
corporate borrowers. 
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conjecture that several of our previously hypothesized short po- 
sitioning relationships may be even more pronounced during a 
market-wide financial crisis. 
H1 Crisis : Abnormal short interest in EA firms prior to their EAs 
is higher in financial crises than in non-crisis periods. 
If as H1 Crisis suggests, average pre-EA short-selling in EA banks 
is higher in a financial crisis, and there are more extreme nega- 
tive outcomes (almost defining a “financial crisis”), there is almost 
certainly more capital at work seeking pre-EA positioning. What 
does a crisis-related increase in aggregate capital seeking pre-EA 
positions suggest for H2 ’s hypothesized negative correlation be- 
tween on-average larger crisis-period pre-EA positions and their 
related subsequent crisis-era returns? We expect crisis-era compe- 
tition with its more informative pre-EA prices, potential influx of 
marginally less talented short selling, and greater bunching of re- 
turns in the neighborhood of a binding lower bound of -100% all 
to result in attenuated aggregate pre-EA short seller skill. 
H2 Crisis : The negative relationship between abnormal short in- 
terest in EA firms prior to their EAs and subsequent returns 
is weaker during a financial crisis. 
A broad financial crisis also likely reflects conditions where 
short sellers can benefit by taking profits at the EA and redirect- 
ing capital towards prospecting for pre-EA banking firms which are 
(temporarily) in relatively greater aggregate supply. 
H3 Crisis : In a financial crisis, abnormal short interest decreases 
more from its pre-EA level. 
A crisis-related de-emphasis on post-announcement banks op- 
erating under EAs suggests attenuated investment and related 
post-announcement skill in the cross-section of those banks. 
H4 Crisis : In a financial crisis, abnormal short interest following 
an EA announcement is less negatively related to subsequent 
returns. 
4. Sample description and analyses 
4.1. The bank firm universe and EA sample 
As discussed in Section 2 , 180 firms within our 628 bank-firm 
dataset receive at least one EA initiation during 2007–2012. We an- 
alyze only those EAs that impose constraints on growth, distribu- 
tions, and capital raises as described in Delis et al. (2017) as Class 
1 actions. For firms that receive multiple Class 1 EA initiations, we 
use the earliest EA. 11 We assign each EA firm one of five outcomes: 
“survives EA” (i.e., all EAs are terminated by the regulator while 
the firm remains listed), “acquired” without regulator assistance by 
another firm while operating with at least one EA, “delists when 
bank fails”, “other delisting” while operating with at least one EA 
(e.g., the firm can no longer maintain exchange requirements such 
as price of at least $1/share), or “still listed with EA” as of the end 
of 2015. 
Table 1 Panel A shows that about a third of firms (63 firms) sur- 
vive EAs. They operate under one or more EAs for almost 3 years 
(duration mean is 35.1 months). Firms that have the shortest time 
operating under EAs on average are those that delist concurrent 
with bank failure (duration mean of just 7.4 months) followed by 
firms that delist for other reasons (15.1 months measured from EA 
11 An internet appendix provides a detailed description of how we constructed the 
628-firm dataset. 
initiation to delisting date). 12 Fourteen firms that receive initial EAs 
in 2007 – 2012 continue to operate under at least one EA continu- 
ously as of the end of 2015. 
As an indication of the impact for the firm’s shareholders (and 
opportunity for short sellers), we calculate buy-and-hold returns, 
measured from the day of initiation of the first EA until the firm 
recovers, delists, is acquired, or the end of 2015 (for firms still 
listed with an EA). Table 1 Panel A reports these raw returns as 
well as “excess return” (versus CRSP value-weighted return). Firms 
with the worst returns are those that delist due to bank failure 
or other reason (a mean raw return of -93.2% and -74.7%, respec- 
tively). Buy-and-hold returns for firms that survive EAs are not 
much different from the CRSP value-weighted index with a mean 
of -0.5% and median of 8.2% versus the index over the 3-year av- 
erage duration under an EA. 
Additional information in Table 1 Panel A describes the out- 
comes by year the first EA is initiated. 13 The years with the high- 
est number of first EAs are 2009 and 2010. 14 For the 73 firms that 
delist (due to bank failure or other reasons), first EA initiations oc- 
cur most frequently in 2009. Only four of the firms that receive 
initiations in 2011 or 2012 delist. 
4.2. Abnormal short interest, returns, and other variables 
We use raw short interest ratio and abnormal short interest ra- 
tio as measures of short selling. Raw short interest ratio equals 
the shares short at month end (Compustat) divided by shares out- 
standing (CRSP). 15 As in Desai et al. (2016) , we use the Karpoff and 
Lou (2010) abnormal short interest ratio regression model that in- 
corporates five factors: size, book-to-market, momentum, turnover, 
and institutional ownership. Abnormal short interest ( ABSI ) equals 
the firm’s raw short interest ratio minus that predicted by the 
model. 
Monthly return data are from CRSP. Additional analysis vari- 
ables are bank capital ratios, non-performing loans, bank Z-scores, 
and bank liquidity as defined in Deli et al. (2019) using Compus- 
tat data at the firm level. Other control variables are size, book-to- 
market, momentum, institutional ownership, and turnover. Size is 
market capitalization (CRSP). Book-to-market is book value (Com- 
pustat) divided by market capitalization. Momentum is 12-month 
cumulative return. Institutional ownership is shares owned by in- 
stitutions (Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database) 
scaled by shares outstanding (CRSP). Turnover is the monthly share 
volume divided by shares outstanding (CRSP). Table 1 Panel B 
presents summary statistics for firm-month observations for the 
628 firms. 
Fig. 3 shows (for the 180 EA firms) buy-and-hold abnormal re- 
turns, ABSI, and the number of firms that delist in EA event time 
“t” for 12 months before and after the initiation, where initiation 
is event month “t” equals 0. The upper panel shows means of ab- 
normal buy-and-hold returns BHAR[-12,t]. Abnormal return equals 
the EA firm’s return minus the CRSP value-weighted return. BHAR 
trends negatively on average and more so in the crisis. The middle 
panel shows ABSI[t]. ABSI is higher on average for firms with EA 
initiations in the crisis. The bottom panel shows by event month 
the number of firms that delist during the first 12 months the firm 
12 All except one of the firms that delist due to bank failure operate with an EA 
for at least a month prior to and at the time of failure. The exception is Washington 
Mutual, which failed in September 2008. 
13 Outcomes by regulator are provided in the internet appendix. 
14 Four firms receive initiations during the time the 2008 short sale ban is in ef- 
fect (i.e., Sept. 19 through Oct. 7). One of the firms fails 8 months later. The other 
three survive for at least two and a half years. 
15 Short interest reporting frequency is twice per month during our sample period. 
We use short interest measured closet to month end. For dual share class firms, we 
use the common share class with the highest trading volume. 
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Duration (months) Buy and hold return Excess return 
Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
All Firms 180 24.7 21.3 -13.6% -45.8% -44.5% -70.4% 
By Outcome 
Survives EA 63 35.1 32.0 46.2% 36.1% -0.5% 8.2% 
Acquired 30 15.8 11.8 16.2% -5.8% -1.3% -27.9% 
Delists when bank fails 30 7.4 6.7 -93.2% -95.6% -105.6% -106.6% 
Other delisting 43 15.1 12.8 -74.7% -82.4% -92.1% -95.0% 
Still listed with EA 14 63.0 63.7 11.0% -25.7% -58.2% -82.1% 
Outcomes by year initiated 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Survives EA 1 2 14 28 10 8 63 
Acquired 2 4 4 9 7 4 30 
Delists when bank fails 0 7 18 4 1 0 30 
Other delisting 1 6 20 13 2 1 43 
Still listed with EA 0 0 1 6 5 2 14 
All 4 19 57 60 25 15 180 
Panel B Monthly Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. 25th %-tile 75th %-tile 
Short interest ratio (%) 31,187 3.235 1.509 4.305 0.062 4.892 
ABSI (%) 31,187 0.152 -0.107 2.891 -1.190 0.782 
Return (%) 31,187 -0.401 -0.147 12.314 -5.677 4.912 
Size (in million $) 31,187 1180.6 144.2 4181.1 48.3 499.5 
Book-to-market 31,187 1.284 0.993 0.958 0.733 1.453 
Momentum 31,187 -0.038 0.018 0.402 -0.210 0.194 
Turnover 31,187 0.081 0.039 0.112 0.014 0.100 
Inst. ownership 31,187 0.337 0.285 0.245 0.124 0.528 
Bank capital 31,187 0.146 0.138 0.040 0.121 0.161 
Non-perform loans 31,187 0.032 0.022 0.032 0.010 0.043 
Bank Z-score 31,187 31.78 23.20 29.46 10.11 42.88 
Bank liquidity 31,187 0.053 0.039 0.044 0.023 0.067 
Panel A reports summary statistics by outcome for the 180 firms that receive EAs during 2007–2012. Duration is the time the 
firm operates with EAs (or from initiation to delisting). Buy-and-hold return and return minus CRSP value-weighted return 
(excess return) are from the initiation of the EA until the firm survives, delists, or is acquired. Firms still listed with at least 
one EA are as of the end of 2015. Lower rows report number of observations by outcome for year of initiation. Panel B 
reports summary statistics for the variables used for benchmarking and analysis. Firm-month observations are for all firms 
with (180 firms) or without (448 firms) an EA during the 2007–2012 sample period. Short interest ratio is common shares 
short (Compustat) divided by common shares outstanding (CRSP). ABSI is abnormal short interest ratio obtained using the 
Karpoff and Lou (2010) five-factor model. Return is buy-and-hold return (CRSP). Size is market capitalization (closing price 
multiplied by shares outstanding, CRSP). Inst. ownership is shares owned by institutions scaled by shares outstanding. Book- 
to-market is book value (Compustat) divided by market capitalization. Momentum is 12-month cumulative return. Turnover is 
the monthly share volume divided by shares outstanding (CRSP). Bank capital is the total of Tier 1 and 2 capital divided by 
risk-weighted assets. Non-perform loans is non-performing loans divided by total loans. Bank Z-score is the sum of return on 
bank assets and bank capital, divided by the standard deviation of return on firm assets for the prior 5 years of quarterly data. 
Return on bank assets is the firm’s before-tax profit divided by total assets. Bank liquidity is cash and due from banks plus 
federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell divided by total assets. Bank variables are at the firm 
level for most recent quarter (Compustat). 
operates with the EA. It is worth noting that ABSI in Fig. 3 bench- 
marks “abnormal” short selling using the 5-factor model but does 
not control for short selling that would be “normal” for bank firms 
with similar fundamentals (e.g., bank capital ratios) that never re- 
ceive an EA. 
4.3. Two-stage regression specification and results 
Our panel includes the observations for all banking firms dur- 
ing 2007 to 2013 irrespective of whether the firms experience an 
EA. In order to investigate potentially different structural relation- 
ships between endogenous short seller positioning before and after 
EAs and the subsequent returns, we adopt the following two-stage 
regression specification for the endogenous metric Abnormal Short 
Interest (ABSI) for firm i at calendar month t from the beginning 
of our sample and subsequent return: 
ABS I i,t = β0 + β1 Befe a i,t + β2 Befe a i,t x delists + β3 Afte a i,t 
+ β4 Afte a i,t x delists + β5 Bank capita l i,t−1 + β6 Non 
− performing loan s i,t−1 + β7 Bank Z − scor e i,t−1 
+ β8 Bank liquidit y i,t−1 + β9 Log ( Size ) i,t−1 
+ β10 Book − to − marke t i,t−1 + β11 Momentu μi,t−1 
+ β12 Turnove r i,t−1 + μi,t (1) 
Retur n i , t = β0 + β1 ABSI h i , t −1 + β2 Befe a i , t −1 x ABSI h i , t −1 
+ β3 Befe a i , t x delists x ABSI h i , t −1 
+ β4 Afte a i , t −1 x ABSI h i , t −1 
+ β5 Afte a i , t x delists x ABSI h i , t −1 + β6 Befe a i , t −1 
+ β7 Befe a i , t x delists + β8 Afte a i , t −1 
+ β9 Afte a i , t x delists + β10 Log ( Size ) i , t −1 
+ β11 Book − to − marke t i , t −1 
+ β12 Momentu m i , t −1 + m i , t (2) 
where ABSIh i,t-1 is the fitted (without the first-stage error term 
μi,t ) abnormal short interest from the first stage. Consistent with 
the short selling literature for non-bank specific analyses (e.g., 
Karpoff and Lou, 2010 ; Desai et al., 2016 ), the benchmark metric 
abnormal short interest (ABSI) compares each firm’s short inter- 
est to that of other firms each month where firms are matched 
with high, medium and low partitions of firms by employing five 
matching factors (size, book-to-market, momentum, turnover, and 
institutional ownership). Prior studies have confirmed that these 
five factors are associated with short sellers’ positioning. For the 
first stage’s fitting of ABSI, however, the regression specification 
also includes four of those matching factors (size, book-to-market, 
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Fig. 3. Event time of EAs and buy-and-hold returns. This figure shows means of 
abnormal buy-and-hold returns BHAR[-12,t] (upper panel) and short interest ratio 
ABSI[t] (middle panel) versus event month “t” where EA initiation is event month 
“0”. Means are for the full sample of firms and whether initiation is in the crisis 
or non-crisis period. The bottom panel shows by event month the number of firms 
that delist during the first 12 months the firm operates with the EA. 
momentum and turnover) as continuous control variables due to 
their possible explanatory power for ABSI over time. Institutional 
ownership, however, is excluded as a continuous control variable 
in both stages due to its high correlation with Log(Size). 
Importantly for our analyses, the matching-partition-oriented 
metric ABSI is not structured to reflect important ancillary public 
fundamental bank information, such as found in quarterly financial 
filings that may also predict short seller positioning. For example, 
weak bank fundamental information – specifically, low bank capi- 
tal ratios, high non-performing loan ratios, low bank Z-scores, and 
low bank liquidity – are associated with a higher likelihood of the 
distress that leads to receiving an EA ( Deli et al., 2019 ). Our first- 
stage fitting of ABSI adds these observables as control variables be- 
cause banking firm short selling is expected to be associated with 
these variables even when a firm never receives an EA. The sec- 
ond stage regression is a traditional asset pricing examination that 
seeks to relate returns to the usual factors of size, book-to-market 
and momentum, but also to expected ABSI. 
In order to investigate the hypothesized structural breaks, both 
stages of the regression specification employ indicator variables to 
distinguish observation months: (i) in the 12 months preceding an 
EA (Befea i,t ); (ii) in the 12 months (inclusive of initiation month) 
of an EA (Aftea i,t ); and for firms that eventually delist while op- 
erating with an EA (delists). 16 The structure of the indicator vari- 
16 That is, Befea equals 1 only when the firm receives an EA in one of the follow- 
ing 12 months and zero otherwise. Aftea equals 1 only when a firm is in one of its 
ables therefore creates “baseline” estimations for non-EA firm ABSI 
(i.e., firms that do not have a Befea period or an Aftea period 17 ). 
All interpretations can therefore be compared to contemporaneous 
baseline (non-EA) ABSIs and related subsequent returns. Note that 
the first stage uses the indicator variable and interactions to en- 
able an investigation of hypothesized structural differences in ABSI 
levels (intercept fixed effects) in the linear fitting of observed ABSI. 
The second stage, however, uses those same indicator variables not 
only to enable an investigation of hypothesized structural differ- 
ences in return levels (intercept fixed effects), but also of hypoth- 
esized structural differences in return correlations (slopes in ex- 
pected ABSI) in the linear fitting of observed returns before and 
after EA announcements. 
Table 2 presents OLS estimates for the first stage regression in 
column (A). For comparison column (B) reports results estimation 
of the model when indicator variables are excluded. It is worth 
noting that for both estimations the coefficient estimates for bank 
capital, non-performing loans, and bank liquidity are significant at 
conventional levels, and that the signs are as expected if the ABSI 
metric is systematically higher for firms with weak bank funda- 
mental information. These results confirm that heightened short 
positions are associated with weak bank fundamental information 
regardless whether the firm ever receives or operates with an EA. 
The exception is for bank Z-score, whose coefficient estimate has 
the opposite sign from expected. Table 2 Columns (C) and (D) 
presents OLS estimates for the second stage regression with and 
without the indicator variables and interactions. 18 We now turn to 
hypothesis tests. 
4.3.1. Is pre-EA short positioning abnormally high (H1) ? 
Table 3 Panel A uses estimates from Table 2 Column (A) to 
test H1 ’s conjecture of abnormally high pre-EA short positioning. 
The first-stage estimation provides two related estimations of dif- 
ferences from non-EA firms’ baseline ABSI. As shown in the “Full 
sample” Column, we find an insignificantly lower ABSI (than base- 
line non-EA firms) for survivors (-0.130) and a significantly higher 
ABSI for eventual delisters (0.382 ∗∗∗). The ABSI for delisters equals 
the sum of estimates for Befea and Befea x delists, with signifi- 
cance determined by Wald tests. As borrowing shares to short is 
not uniformly frictionless, Table 3 ’s other columns consider sub- 
samples likely varying in their appeal to short sellers due to those 
frictions. “Price ≥ $1/share” excludes so-called “penny stock” ob- 
servations when the month’s stock price is less than one dollar per 
share. “Average daily volume ≥ $50 0 0” excludes firms with very 
low average daily trading volume (ADV) that could prove difficult 
to short. 19 “Size ≥ $50 M” focuses on firms above the 25th per- 
centile of our sample’s market caps (at $48.3 million) presumed 
to have sufficient market cap to represent (for short sellers) large 
potential dollar profit opportunities rather than just large negative 
returns on small dollar positions. Employing Balasubramnian and 
Palvia’s (2018) cutoff, firms having “Assets < $50 B” are likely not 
“To Big To Fail” (TBTF). They are therefore likely to be free of damp- 
first 12 months of operating with an EA, including the initiation month. At the ear- 
lier of the firm’s delisting or the completion of that 12 months following the EA, the 
firm no longer contributes observations. As we will be considering crisis and non- 
crisis subsamples, we include 2013 because it is clearly a non-crisis year and this 
allows us to follow firms with EA initiations during 2012. We exclude 2006 because 
it is unclear whether this is a crisis or non-crisis year. Desai et al., (2016) find that 
short sellers may have forecast financial distress by 2006. Given that some firms 
were “treated” in all of their contributed observations, we have omitted firm fixed 
effects which would confound identifying treatment effects. 
17 Some non-EA firms delist during 2007 – 2013, but they never operate with an 
EA. We include them in the sample until they delist. 
18 Modifying returns to be measured in excess of market returns leads to all of 
the same basic inferences. 
19 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Table 2 
OLS estimates for the first and second stage regressions for 2007 to 2013. 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
First Stage (Fitting ABSI) Second Stage (Allocation Skill) 
Dependent Variable: ABSI ABSI Return Return 
Row Independent Variable 
(1) ABSIh -0.416 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.780 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(2) Befea -0.130 (0.179) -3.742 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(3) Befea x delists 0.512 ∗∗∗ (0.002) -6.463 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(4) Befea x ABSIh -0.836 (0.055) ∗
(5) Befea x delists x ABSIh 0.583 (0.425) 
(6) Aftea x ABSIh -0.224 (0.505) 
(7) Aftea x delists x ABSIh 0.239 (0.689) 
(8) Aftea -0.488 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -1.536 (0.003) ∗∗∗
(9) Aftea x delists -0.314 (0.118) -6.091 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(10) Bank capital -4.233 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -3.813 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(11) Non-performing loans 17.641 0.000 ∗∗∗ 15.867 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(12) Bank Z-score 0.007 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.007 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(13) Bank liquidity -5.419 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -5.744 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(14) Log(Size) -0.555 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.55 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.082 (0.099) ∗ 0.132 (0.010) ∗∗∗
(15) Book-to-market -0.492 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.485 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 1.976 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 1.369 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(16) Momentum 0.079 (0.155) 0.079 (0.148) 2.358 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 3.164 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(17) Turnover 10.284 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 10.211 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(18) Constant 2.948 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 2.914 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -2.617 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -2.602 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(19) N 31,187 31,187 31,187 31,187 
(20) R-squared 0.143 0.143 0.036 0.016 
Table 2 presents OLS estimates for the first stage regression ( Eq. 1 ) in column (A) and second stage regression ( Eq. 2 ) in column (C) as given in Section 4.3 . 
Firm-month observations are for all 628 banking firms during 2007 to 2013 irrespective of whether the firms experience an EA. Independent variable ABSIh in 
the second stage is the fitted (without the first-stage error term) abnormal short interest from the first stage. Indicator variables and cross terms in rows (2) 
through (9) distinguish event observation months for 180 firms that experience an EA in the 12 months preceding an EA ( Befea ) and in the first 12 months 
(inclusive of initiation month) operating with an EA ( Aftea ), and for firms that eventually delist while operating with an EA ( delists ). Control variables in rows 
(10) through (17) are as defined in Table 1 panel (B). Section 4.3 provides the model’s further details. For comparison columns (B) and (D) report results for 
estimation of the model when indicator variables are excluded. Robust p-values are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively, for two-sided t-tests of coefficient estimates. 
Table 3 
Tests of hypotheses H1, H2, H3 , and H4 for 2007 to 2013. 
Full sample Price ≥ $1/share ADV ≥ $50 0 0 Size ≥ $50 M Assets < $50 B "Sweet spot" 
Row Panel A: Examination of H1 (Abnormal Short Positioning Preceding EAs) 
(1) Befea -0.130 -0.092 -0.143 -0.436 ∗∗∗ 0.205 ∗ 0.029 
(2) Befea x delists 0.512 ∗∗∗ 0.513 ∗∗∗ 0.693 ∗∗∗ 2.415 ∗∗∗ 0.114 1.673 ∗∗∗
(3) Befea + Befea x delists 0.382 ∗∗∗ 0.421 ∗∗∗ 0.550 ∗∗∗ 1.979 ∗∗∗ 0.319 ∗∗ 1.702 ∗∗∗
Panel B: Examination of H2 (Cross-Sectional Allocation Skill Prior to EAs) 
(4) ABSIh -0.416 ∗∗∗ -0.398 ∗∗∗ -0.373 ∗∗∗ -0.321 ∗∗∗ -0.407 ∗∗∗ -0.354 ∗∗∗
(5) Befea x ABSIh -0.836 ∗ -1.280 ∗∗∗ -0.687 ∗ -1.069 ∗∗∗ -0.449 -0.736 
(6) ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh -1.252 ∗∗∗ -1.678 ∗∗∗ -1.060 ∗∗∗ -1.390 ∗∗∗ -0.856 ∗ -1.090 ∗∗∗
(7) Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh -0.253 -0.272 -0.224 -1.131 -0.333 -0.924 
(8) ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh -0.669 -0.670 -0.597 -1.452 ∗ -0.740 -1.278 ∗∗
Row Panel C: Examination of H3 (Abnormal Short Positioning Following EA Announcements) 
(9) Aftea -0.488 ∗∗∗ -0.561 ∗∗∗ -0.531 ∗∗∗ -1.237 ∗∗∗ -0.196 ∗ -0.991 ∗∗∗
(10) Aftea x delists -0.314 0.252 -0.028 3.591 ∗∗∗ -0.423 ∗∗ 3.210 ∗∗∗
(11) Aftea + Aftea x delists -0.802 ∗∗∗ -0.308 -0.559 ∗∗ 2.354 ∗∗∗ -0.619 ∗∗∗ 2.220 ∗∗∗
(12) Aftea - Befea -0.358 ∗∗∗ -0.468 ∗∗∗ -0.388 -0.801 ∗∗∗ -0.401 ∗∗∗ -1.020 ∗∗∗
(13) Aftea + Aftea x delists – (Befea + Befea x delists) -1.184 ∗∗∗ -0.729 ∗∗∗ -1.109 ∗∗∗ 0.375 -0.938 ∗∗∗ 0.517 
(14) Difference -0.826 ∗∗∗ -0.261 -0.721 ∗∗ 1.176 -0.537 ∗∗ 1.537 ∗∗
Panel D: Examination of H4 (Cross-Sectional Allocation Skill Following EA Announcements) 
(15) Aftea x ABSIh -0.224 -0.368 -0.148 -0.732 ∗ -0.324 -0.970 ∗
(16) ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh -0.640 ∗ -0.766 ∗∗ -0.512 ∗ -1.053 ∗∗∗ -0.731 ∗ -1.324 ∗∗
(17) Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh 0.015 -0.811 -0.045 -2.193 ∗ -0.258 -2.247 ∗∗
(18) ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh -0.401 -1.209 ∗∗ -0.418 -2.514 ∗∗ -0.665 -2.601 ∗∗
Panels A through D report relevant comparisons of coefficient estimates using the OLS regressions (as in Table 2 ) for 2007 to 2013 for testing hypotheses H1, H2, H3 , and 
H4 . Section 4.3 provides a discussion of each hypothesis and connections to table rows. Columns report estimates for the full sample (as in Table 2 ) as well as for the 
following subsamples: stock price of at least $1/share, average daily trading volume (“ADV”) of at least $50 0 0, market cap (“Size”) of at least $50 million, and total assets 
of at least $50 billion. The “Sweet spot” subsample consists of firms with market cap of at least $50 million and with total assets of at least $50 billion. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-sided Wald tests. 
ened short seller interest due to anticipation of government inter- 
vention forestalling future losses in TBTF banks. 20 Finally, we use 
the combination “Assets < $50 B & Size > $50 M as a likely short 
seller “Sweet spot” of banking firms offering short sellers sufficient 
20 While just one of our TBTF banking firms (Wachovia) operated with EAs in the 
crisis period, seven received EAs in the non-crisis period. 
dollar profit opportunities while not being TBTF. Subsample restric- 
tions are applied to all firms regardless of whether they ever re- 
ceive an EA. 
Table 3 Row (1) displays subsample coefficient estimates for Be- 
fea for firms that survive EAs (survivors) and Table 4 Row (3) dis- 
plays the analogous subsample coefficient estimate sums for firms 
that delist while operating under an EA (delisters). Accordingly, 
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Table 4 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimates for the crisis and non-crisis periods. 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
First Stage (Fitting ABSI) Second Stage (Allocation Skill) 
Dependent Variable: ABSI ABSI ABSI Return Return Return 
Row Independent Variable Crisis Non-crisis Crisis – Non-crisis Crisis Non-crisis Crisis – Non-crisis 
(1) ABSIh -0.107 (0.353) -0.669 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.562 (0.001) ∗∗∗
(2) Befea 0.193 (0.181) -0.451 (0.001) ∗∗∗ 0.644 (0.001) ∗∗∗ -2.913 (0.002) ∗∗∗ -4.728 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 1.815 (0.115) 
(3) Befea x delists 0.608 (0.004) ∗∗∗ -0.887 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 1.495 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -7.264 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -7.656 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.392 (0.869) 
(4) Befea x ABSIh -1.172 (0.101) -0.957 (0.096) ∗ -0.215 (0.815) 
(5) Befea x delists x ABSIh 1.164 (0.204) -2.393 (0.067) ∗ 3.557 (0.026) ∗∗
(6) Aftea -0.860 (0.001) ∗∗∗ -0.448 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.412 (0.150) -1.418 (0.406) -2.615 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 1.197 (0.503) 
(7) Aftea x delists 0.536 (0.125) -1.023 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 1.559 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -6.032 (0.012) ∗∗ -5.651 (0.002) ∗∗∗ -0.381 (0.900) 
(8) Aftea x ABSIh 0.041 (0.966) -0.346 (0.382) 0.387 (0.707) 
(9) Aftea x delists x ABSIh -0.513 (0.654) 0.496 (0.585) -1.009 (0.490) 
(10) Bank capital -3.731 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -7.95 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 4.219 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(11) Non-performing loans 20.025 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 17.254 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 2.771 (0.123) 
(12) Bank Z-score 0.006 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.011 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.005 (0.001) ∗∗∗
(13) Bank liquidity -9.09 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -3.163 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -5.927 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(14) Log(Size) -0.713 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.447 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.266 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.149 (0.051) ∗ -0.083 (0.184) 0.232 (0.019) ∗∗
(15) Book-to-market -0.504 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.598 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.094 (0.156) 1.742 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 1.309 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.433 (0.197) 
(16) Momentum 0.478 (0.000) ∗∗∗ -0.213 -0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.691 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.9 (0.098) ∗ -0.298 (0.471) 1.198 (0.079) ∗
(17) Turnover 12.284 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 7.974 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 4.31 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(18) Constant 3.65 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 3.187 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.463 (0.039) ∗∗ -4.163 (0.000) ∗∗∗ 0.569 (0.305) -4.732 (0.000) ∗∗∗
(19) N 14,792 16,395 14,792 16,395 
(20) R-squared 0.181 0.123 0.027 0.036 
Table 4 presents estimates for the first stage regression ( Eq. 1 ) in columns (A) and (B) and second stage regression ( Eq. 2 ) in columns (D) and (E) using a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) approach for estimating the two-stage regression model in the crisis (20 07 – 20 09) and non-crisis (2010 – 2013) periods. Variables are 
as described in Table 2 . Columns (C) and (F) report the difference in estimates (Crisis – Non-crisis). Section 4.4 provides further discussion. Robust p-values are in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-sided t-tests of coefficient estimates in columns (A), (B), (D), and (E), 
and for two-sided Wald tests in columns (C) and (F). 
Row (2) presents the increase from survivor to delister. Not sur- 
prisingly given that they survive, Row (1)’s estimates indicate that 
truly abnormal (beyond comparable non-EA firms) pre-EA short 
positioning in eventual survivors is mixed across subsamples and 
indicates a level generally insignificantly different from positioning 
in comparable non-EA firms. However, Row (3)’s estimates indicate 
pre-EA short positioning in eventual delisters while operating with 
an EA that is robustly and uniformly higher than the baseline for 
comparable non-EA firms, and particularly so for firms with suf- 
ficient market cap to offer significant dollar profit opportunities 
(1.979 ∗∗∗). Row (2) confirms that the increased positioning in delis- 
ters compared to survivors is robustly significant. We conclude that 
H1 ’s general conjecture of abnormally high pre-EA positioning by 
short sellers is strongly supported although it is generally driven 
by positioning in delisters rather than survivors. 
4.3.2. Does pre-EA short positioning reflect cross-sectional allocation 
skill (H2) ? 
Hypothesis H2 suggests that in the months preceding EA ini- 
tiations, the firm’s abnormal short interest is negatively related 
to subsequent returns. The general notion of short seller exper- 
tise suggests that abnormal short selling and subsequent returns 
should be negatively related even for firms that never receive an 
EA (non-EA firms). 21 Skill in short selling should not only exhibit 
as picking firms that subsequently struggle beyond the level priced 
into the stock, but also should exhibit as taking larger (smaller) po- 
sitions in firms that experience larger (smaller) subsequent nega- 
tive, or even positive, returns. Short seller expertise leads to our 
anticipation that the second-stage coefficient estimate for ABSIh 
should generally be negative (the larger the position the more neg- 
ative the subsequent return). The coefficient estimate of interest 
for testing H2 as stated is the sum of that base coefficient for 
21 Note, however, that conditioning the baseline skill level on lack of a future EA 
biases this baseline down since it eliminates firms that will receive an EA. That is, 
short seller skill in general is at least as high in general as it is in the sample of 
firms that never experience the generally-negative event of receiving an EA. 
ABSI h and the coefficient for the interaction effect specific to the 
pre-EA period: Befea x ABSIh. The sum of the two provides the to- 
tal estimated negative (slope) relationship between fitted ABSI and 
subsequent return for EA firms in their pre-EA periods while tak- 
ing into account other observable explanatory factors. Although not 
directly hypothesized in H2 , the second-stage specification also al- 
lows us to consider the coefficient for Befea x ABSIh in isolation to 
examine if short sellers appear even more skilled in emphasizing 
big losers and/or deemphasizing others in the subset of firms that 
subsequently experience an EA. 
Table 2 Column (D) reports the relevant second stage regression 
estimations in the absence of the indicators variables and inter- 
actions. As anticipated given prior findings regarding short seller 
skill, baseline coefficient estimates for ABSIh (in non-EA firms) 
are significantly negative (-0.780 ∗∗∗). In Column (C)’s focal second- 
stage regressions (that include the indicators and interactions), 
they are as well (-0.416 ∗∗∗). These baseline estimates strongly sug- 
gest that short sellers exhibit cross-sectional allocation talent as a 
norm even when considering only firms that never receive an EA. 
Turning to Table 3 Panel B, we examine H2’s hypothesis of a 
negative relationship for firms subsequently experiencing an EA. 
The estimates suggest multiple insights. For eventual survivors , 
Table 3 Panel B Row (6) displays a consistently negative relation- 
ship in pre-EA periods (e.g., Full Sample -1.252 ∗∗∗). Row (5) con- 
firms a robust significantly negative incremental slope in the pre- 
EA (Befea) period (e.g., Full sample -0.836 ∗). For delisting firms, 
Table 3 Panel B Row (8) displays a fairly consistent insignificantly 
negative total slope (e.g., Full sample -0.669). Row (7)’s coefficients 
suggest that these slopes appear to be more negative than the al- 
ready significantly negative slope for the baseline non-EA firms 
(e.g., Full Sample -0.669 is more negative by -0.253 than -0.416 ∗∗∗). 
However, covariation in the reduced sample size of delisting firms 
“robs” the apparently more negative coefficient of its significance. 
Additionally, we cannot reject that the slopes are the same across 
the non-EA baseline and delisting firms in the pre-EA period (e.g., 
in Full sample 0.253 is not significant). Summarizing Table 3 Panel 
B’s pre-EA evidence on skill, in our sample, banking firm short sell- 
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ers exhibit significant baseline (non-EA), and significant (insignif- 
icant) additional specific pre-EA expertise in survivors (delisters) 
through greater abnormal positioning in big losers and/or lesser 
abnormal positioning in firms that lose less or even gain. In con- 
trast to the delister drivers for pre-EA positioning as hypothesized 
in H1 , here we have survivor drivers for pre-EA skill as hypoth- 
esized in H2 . Overall, our sample exhibits strong and subsample 
robust evidence of pre-EA short seller expertise as hypothesized in 
H2 . 
4.3.3. Is short positioning following EA announcements abnormally 
high (H3) ? 
H3 ’s hypotheses deal with short seller positioning levels sub- 
sequent to the announcement of an EA under the notion that EA 
announcements act as information-homogenizing events that in- 
cent short seller profit taking. Table 3 Panel C indicates that short 
positioning following an EA is significantly less than baseline for 
survivors (e.g., Full sample -0.488 ∗∗∗) and delisters (e.g., Full sam- 
ple -0.802 ∗∗∗). With respect to the specific hypothesis regarding 
positioning adjustments following EA announcements, consistent 
with H3 Survives , Table 3 Panel C Row (12) confirms the tendency for 
survivor firm short positioning to decrease in response to the EA 
(e.g., Full sample -0.358 ∗∗∗). Regarding H3 Delists , Row (13) displays 
an even greater tendency to decrease for delisters (e.g., Full sam- 
ple -1.184 ∗∗∗ representing an additional decrease at -0.826 ∗∗∗). This 
greater profit-taking decrease in short seller positioning for even- 
tual delisters appears in all subsamples other than those contain- 
ing sufficient market cap to represent significant remaining dol- 
lar profit opportunities for short sellers. For Size ≥ $50 M, delis- 
ters who are already experiencing significantly higher position- 
ing prior to the EA announcement ( Table 3 Panel A Row (3)’s 
1.979 ∗∗∗) experience a post-announcement increase ( Table 3 Panel 
C Row (13)’s 0.375). The result is a continuation of, or possibly 
even increase in, the significantly higher-than-baseline positioning. 
(Panel C Row (11)’s 2.354 ∗∗∗ = Panel A Row (1)’s 1.979 ∗∗∗ + Panel 
C Row (14)’s 0.375). Not surprisingly, this increase of 0.375 ap- 
pears to differ from the post-announcement decrease experienced 
by survivors ( Table 3 Panel C Row (12)). To recap, our sample con- 
firms H3’s basic hypothesis about (lower than comparable non- 
EA) short positioning in EA firms following the announcement of 
EAs and confirms H3 Survives ’s specific decrease in short position- 
ing follow the announcement. It also verifies H3 Delists ’s ambiguity 
regarding short positioning changes subsequent to EA announce- 
ments for delisters due to the subset of those that have sufficient 
post-announcement market cap to sustain existing, or even attract 
additional, short seller scrutiny and positioning. For that sufficient 
post-announcement market cap subset of delisters, the EA pre- 
cedes, and may even appear to attract , additional abnormal short 
positioning that results in a level significantly exceeding that in 
comparable non-EA firms. 
4.3.4. Does post-EA-announcement positioning reflect allocation skill 
(H4) ? 
The H4 hypothesis addresses talent-related correlation between 
short seller positioning after EA announcements and subsequent 
returns. Table 3 Panel D verifies the presence of H4 ’s hypothe- 
sized short seller skill after EA announcements for survivors (e.g., 
Row (16)’s Full sample -0.640 ∗= -0.416 ∗∗∗ - 0.224). Additionally, 
there is some suggestion, that for survivors, short sellers exhibit 
greater-than-baseline cross-sectional allocation skills after EA an- 
nouncements (Row (15)), presumably from avoiding big survivor 
rebounds after EAs. For H4 for delisters the conjectured skill ap- 
pears in all subsamples (Row (18)), and is significant for those with 
sufficiently high price (Price ≥ $1/share at 1.209 ∗∗) or market cap 
(e.g. Size ≥ $50 M at -2.514 ∗∗). Support for H4 in delisters ap- 
pears strongest in the short seller “Sweet spot” where a firm has 
sufficient remaining market cap to attract additional short seller 
scrutiny, but is not TBTF (Row (18)’s 2.601 ∗∗). Regarding potential 
beyond-baseline skill, however, there is no significant evidence of 
greater-than-baseline skill in short seller post-announcement allo- 
cations across delisters other than for firms with sufficiently large 
remaining market cap (Row (17)’s Size ≥ $50 M at -2.193 ∗). As ex- 
pected, the evidence is greatest when the firm is also TBTF (Row 
(17)’s Assets < $50 B & Size ≥ $50 M at 2.247 ∗∗). On balance, 
other than for the Size ≥ $50 M and “Sweet spot” subsamples 
where additional short seller investment may be warranted, EA an- 
nouncements appear to provide substantive information homoge- 
nization and incent profit taking. For delisters, the resulting dimin- 
ished opportunities for profits places short sellers in a context fos- 
tering a similar level of cross-sectional allocation skill as that found 
for non-EA firms. Summarizing our post-announcement results, we 
find robust evidence of short seller skill for survivors regardless of 
subsample, but only for large remaining market cap delisters . 
4.4. Investigating structural differences in a financial crisis 
In order to examine whether prior full-sample results ade- 
quately describe both times of crisis and non-crisis, we engage 
a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) approach for estimating 
the two-stage regression model in the crisis and non-crisis peri- 
ods. Due to the proliferation of banking firm financial distress dur- 
ing a global financial crisis, we expect that short sellers will face 
increased pressure to take profits after an EA and reallocate their 
financial and human capital towards prospecting for more pre-EA 
firms. That is, we expect that the crisis will result is more pre- 
EA positioning and less following EAs. We would also expect that 
conditioning on a crisis decreases short seller profitability and may 
attenuate the usual negative relationship between positioning and 
subsequent return. 
4.4.1. I abnormal short interest higher during a financial crisis 
( H1 Crisis )? 
Regarding background for H1 Crisis , Table 4 Column (C) Row 
(18)’s 0.463 ∗∗ confirms that in our SUR estimation the crisis sub- 
sample reflects the expected positive crisis fixed effect, i.e., the re- 
gression line starts from a higher intercept level of ABSI. While 
a positive crisis fixed effect reflects H1 in a general sense as a 
starting point for all firms, incremental EA-related positioning be- 
yond contemporaneous comparable non-EA firm baselines is our 
main concern. Due to contemporaneous comparable firm baselin- 
ing, a given level of positive (negative) ABSI would be less (more) 
likely to be flagged as “truly abnormal” – i.e., above (below) com- 
parable firm levels in the same period – in crisis rather than non- 
crisis. In line with this tendency, Column (A) confirms for survivors 
the presence of insignificant above-higher-crisis-period-baseline 
pre-EA short positioning during Crisis (Row (2)’s 0.193). Column 
(B) confirms for survivors significantly less-than-lower-non-crisis- 
period-baseline pre-EA positioning during Non-crisis (Row (2)’s - 
0.451 ∗∗∗). Regarding a direct examination of baseline-adapted H1 , 
the difference (Colum (C) Row (2)’s + 0.644 ∗∗∗) confirms H1 Crisis 
as applied to surviving firms, i.e., greater truly abnormal (i.e., ex- 
pected ABSI) pre-EA positioning (beyond period-comparable base- 
lines) in surviving firms in a financial crisis. Table 5 Panel A Row 
(3) displays subsample robustness for this difference characteriza- 
tion other than for penny and low volume stocks. (Those stocks 
drive the -0.113 for Assets < $50 B because the difference charac- 
terization still holds for Price ≥ $1/share and for ADV ≥ 50 0 0.) 
Regarding background for H1 Crisis as applied to delisting firms, 
Table 5 Panel A Row (4) confirms significantly greater-than- 
baseline pre-EA short positioning (e.g., Full sample 0.801 ∗∗∗) in 
Crisis, but significantly less-than-baseline pre-EA short positioning 
(e.g., Full sample -1.338 ∗∗∗) in Non-crisis. More to the point, the 
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Table 5 
Tests of hypotheses H1 Crisis and H2 Crisis . 
Full sample Price ≥ $1/share ADV ≥ $50 0 0 Size ≥ $50 M Assets < $50 B "Sweet spot" 
Row Panel A: Examination of H1 Crisis (Pre-EA Abnormal Short Positioning Higher During Crisis) 
(1) Crisis: Befea 0.193 0.233 0.153 0.099 0.146 0.027 
(2) Non-crisis: Befea -0.451 ∗∗∗ -0.422 ∗∗∗ -0.468 ∗∗∗ -1.195 ∗∗∗ 0.259 ∗∗ -0.113 
(3) Crisis - Non-crisis 0.644 ∗∗∗ 0.655 ∗∗∗ 0.621 ∗∗∗ 1.294 ∗∗∗ -0.113 0.140 
(4) Crisis: Befea + Befea x delists 0.801 ∗∗∗ 0.812 ∗∗∗ 0.918 ∗∗∗ 2.145 ∗∗∗ 0.615 ∗∗∗ 1.805 ∗∗∗
(5) Non-crisis: Befea + Befea x delists -1.338 ∗∗∗ -1.200 ∗∗∗ -1.496 ∗∗∗ -2.348 ∗∗∗ -1.079 ∗∗∗ -2.337 ∗∗∗
(6) Crisis - Non-crisis 2.139 ∗∗∗ 2.012 ∗∗∗ 2.414 ∗∗∗ 4.493 ∗∗∗ 1.693 ∗∗∗ 4.142 ∗∗∗
Row Panel B: Examination of H2 Crisis (Pre-EA Cross-Sectional Allocation Skill Attenuates During Crisis) 
(7) Crisis: ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh -1.279 ∗ -1.736 ∗∗ -0.996 -1.484 ∗∗ -1.101 -1.166 
(8) Non-crisis: ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh -1.626 ∗∗∗ -1.932 ∗∗∗ -1.447 ∗∗∗ -1.447 ∗∗ -1.017 -1.186 
(9) Crisis - Non-crisis 0.347 0.196 0.451 -0.037 -0.084 0.020 
(10) Crisis: ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh -0.115 -0.284 -0.107 -1.159 ∗ -0.333 -1.010 ∗
(11) Non-crisis: ABSIh + Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh -4.019 ∗∗∗ -3.437 ∗∗∗ -3.684 ∗∗∗ -5.045 ∗∗∗ -4.285 ∗∗∗ -4.930 ∗∗∗
(12) Crisis - Non-crisis 3.904 ∗∗∗ 3.153 ∗∗ 3.577 ∗∗∗ 3.886 ∗∗ 3.952 ∗∗∗ 3.920 ∗∗∗
(13) Crisis: Befea x ABSIh -1.172 -1.629 ∗∗ -0.928 -1.477 ∗∗ -0.976 -1.069 
(14) Non-crisis: Befea x ABSIh -0.957 ∗ -1.259 ∗∗ -0.832 -0.994 ∗ -0.377 -0.772 
(15) Crisis - Non-crisis -0.215 -0.370 -0.096 -0.483 -0.599 -0.297 
(16) Crisis: Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh -0.008 -0.177 -0.039 -1.152 -0.208 -0.913 
(17) Non-crisis: Befea x ABSIh + Befea x delists x ABSIh -3.350 ∗∗∗ -2.764 ∗∗ -3.069 ∗∗∗ -4.592 ∗∗∗ -3.645 ∗∗∗ -4.516 ∗∗∗
(18) Crisis - Non-crisis 3.342 ∗∗ 2.587 ∗ 3.030 ∗∗ 3.440 ∗∗ 3.437 ∗∗∗ 3.603 ∗∗∗
Panels A and B report relevant comparisons of coefficient estimates using the SUR regression results (as in Table 4 ) for the crisis (2007 – 2009) and non-crisis (2010 –
2013) periods for testing hypotheses H1 Crisis and H2 Crisis . Section 4.4 provides a discussion of related hypotheses and connections to table rows. Columns report estimates 
for the full sample (as in Table 4 ) as well as for the following subsamples: stock price of at least $1/share, average daily trading volume (“ADV”) of at least $50 0 0, market 
cap (“Size”) of at least $50 million, and total assets of at least $50 billion. The “Sweet spot” subsample consists of firms with market cap of at least $50 million and with 
total assets of at least $50 billion. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-sided Wald tests. 
difference (2.139 ∗∗∗) confirms H1 Crisis as applied to delisting firms, 
i.e., greater truly abnormal pre-EA positioning in delisting firms in 
a financial crisis. 
Table 5 Panel A Rows (3) and (6) provide strong evidence for 
H1 Crisis ’s conjecture of higher truly abnormal pre-EA positioning 
in a crisis except for TBTF survivors. As in earlier estimations that 
did not separate the observations into crisis and non-crisis periods, 
there is clear evidence that the higher truly abnormal pre-EA posi- 
tioning is driven by positioning in firms that delist following an EA 
more so than those that survive. We interpret this as evidence of 
the higher level of short seller activity prior to EAs during a crisis. 
Of course, the higher aggregate level could lead to more informa- 
tive prices prior to the EA that then attenuate pre-EA short seller 
profits (e.g., if they all short at the same time in a windfall price 
decline). 
4.4.2. Does pre-EA allocation skill dissipate during a financial crisis 
( H2 Crisis )? 
Our negative slope measure of short seller cross-sectional allo- 
cation skill examines short sellers’ abilities to emphasize (deem- 
phasize) big losers (big winners) in the cross section of firms 
shorted. That type of skill (to help recover the costs of invest- 
ment in expertise) should still be evident, albeit possibly at a re- 
duced level, even when competition among short sellers induces 
on-average more informative pre-EA prices. H2 Crisis hypothesizes 
that, due to increased competition and more informative pre-EA 
prices, the negative relationship between abnormal short interest 
in EA firms prior to their EAs and subsequent returns is weaker 
during a financial crisis. 
Table 4 Column (D) Row (1) indicates that the sign of the non- 
EA baseline relationship is negative in both Crisis (-0.107) and Non- 
crisis (-0.669 ∗∗∗) periods. 22 The significant difference from Non- 
Crisis (0.562 ∗∗∗) suggests that the crisis period attracts or induces 
22 Note that the crisis and non-crisis intercepts are (as in the first stage) signif- 
icantly different. In particular, Table 4 Row (18)’s significantly more negative in- 
tercept (-4.732 ∗∗∗) reflects the expected more negative returns starting point (in- 
tercept) in a “crisis.” Our hypotheses regarding differential position-return negative 
correlations – as proxied by differential slopes in ABSIh – are not directly affected 
by the lower returns crisis starting point (intercept). 
a lower level of cross-sectional allocation talent. This is possibly 
due to: (i) increased crisis-era competition (or perhaps laziness 
given baseline returns significantly more negative in a crisis any- 
way); and potentially (ii) more informative prices at which short 
sellers position even when there is no subsequent EA. H2 Crisis , 
however, is a hypothesis specifically about lower relative pre- 
EA cross-sectional positioning skill during a crisis. For survivors, 
Table 5 Panel B Row (7) confirms an apparently lower level of 
pre-EA skill (Row (7)’s -1.279 ∗) in Crisis than in Non-crisis (Row 
(8)’s -1.626 ∗∗∗). The difference (Row (9)’s 0.347), although insignif- 
icant, is in the direction hypothesized in H2 Crisis as applied to sur- 
vivors . However, given that all previous results have pointed to 
pre-EA positioning in delisting firms as the driving force behind 
measured pre-EA short seller skill, the potentially more interesting 
comparison is for delisters. Table 5 Panel B Row (12) confirms a 
robustly lower level of pre-EA skill (e.g., Full sample 3.904 ∗∗∗) for 
crisis delisters in the direction hypothesized in H2 Crisis . Note that, 
although there is variation across subsamples, for the period’s Full 
sample, Crisis (Non-crisis) skill is insignificantly superior (signifi- 
cantly superior) to baseline non-EA firms for survivors (Full Sam- 
ple -1.172 (Row 13) and -0.957 ∗ (Row14)) and delisters (Full sam- 
ple -0.008 (Row (16)) and -3.350 ∗∗∗ (Row (17)). While there are 
pockets of significantly beyond-baseline non-EA pre-EA skill in sur- 
vivors (e.g., Row (14)’s Price ≥ $1/share at 1.259 ∗∗ Size ≥ $50 M 
at -0.994 ∗), once again the greatest beyond-baseline pre-EA skill, 
and crisis-related difference in pre-EA skill, appears in allocating 
amongst delisting firms (Rows (17) and (18)). Returning to H2 Crisis , 
however, the effect of a crisis in attenuating short sellers’ pre-EA 
cross-sectional allocation talent is notable (Rows (9) and (12)) and 
driven heavily by diminished crisis-era skill in short sellers’ cross- 
sectional allocation skill amongst delisters (Row (12)). 
4.4.3. Is post-announcement profit-taking greater during a financial 
crisis ( H3 Crisis )? 
Moving on to short positioning following EA announcements, re- 
call that the additional pressure for profit-taking in a crisis sug- 
gests reallocating financial and human capital towards prospecting 
for pre-EA firms. In line with that incentive, H3 Crisis conjectures 
that crisis-era abnormal short interest decreases more from pre- 
EA levels. Regarding background for H3 Crisis as applied to surviving 
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Table 6 
Tests of hypotheses H3 Crisis and H4 Crisis . 
Full sample Price ≥ $1/share ADV ≥ $50 0 0 Size ≥ $50 M Assets < $50 B "Sweet spot" 
Row Panel A: Examination of H3 Crisis (Crisis Abnormal Short Positioning Decreases More Following EA Announcements) 
(1) Crisis: Aftea - Befea -1.053 ∗∗∗ -1.367 ∗∗∗ -1.108 ∗∗∗ -2.008 ∗∗∗ -0.862 ∗∗∗ -1.564 ∗∗∗
(2) Non-crisis: Aftea - Befea 0.003 -0.032 -0.004 0.046 -0.303 ∗ -0.580 ∗
(3) Crisis - Non-crisis -1.056 ∗∗∗ -1.335 ∗∗∗ -1.105 ∗∗∗ -2.054 ∗∗∗ -0.560 ∗ -0.984 
(4) Crisis: Aftea + Aftea x delists - (Befea + Befea x delists) -1.125 ∗∗∗ -0.913 ∗∗ -1.196 ∗∗∗ -0.116 -0.976 ∗∗∗ -0.139 
(5) Non-crisis: Aftea + Aftea x delists - (Befea + Befea x delists) -0.133 0.718 ∗∗ 0.417 4.075 ∗∗∗ 0.031 4.437 ∗∗∗
(6) Crisis - Non-crisis -0.992 ∗∗ -1.631 ∗∗∗ -1.613 ∗∗∗ -4.192 ∗∗∗ -1.007 ∗∗ -4.576 ∗∗∗
(7) Crisis: Aftea + Aftea x delists -0.324 -0.101 -0.277 2.029 ∗∗ -0.361 1.666 ∗∗
(8) Non-crisis: Aftea + Aftea x delists -1.471 ∗∗∗ -0.482 ∗ -1.079 ∗∗∗ 1.727 ∗∗∗ -1.048 ∗∗∗ 2.100 ∗∗∗
(9) Crisis - Non-crisis 1.147 ∗∗∗ 0.381 0.802 ∗ 0.301 0.687 ∗∗ -0.434 
Row Panel B: Examination of H4 Crisis (Cross-Sectional Allocation Skill Following EA Announcements Attenuates in Crisis) 
(10) Crisis: ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh -0.066 0.064 -0.078 0.443 -0.195 0.333 
(11) Non-crisis: ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh -1.015 ∗∗∗ -1.054 ∗∗ -0.780 ∗∗ -1.504 ∗∗∗ -1.122 ∗∗ -1.862 ∗∗∗
(12) Crisis - Non-crisis 0.949 1.118 0.702 1.947 0.927 2.195 ∗∗
(13) Crisis: Aftea x ABSIh 0.041 0.171 -0.010 0.450 -0.070 0.430 
(14) Non-crisis: Aftea x ABSIh -0.346 -0.381 -0.165 -1.051 ∗∗ -0.482 -1.448 ∗∗
(15) Crisis - Non-crisis 0.387 0.552 0.155 1.501 0.412 1.878 ∗
(16) Crisis: ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh -0.579 -2.174 -0.327 -1.247 -0.736 -1.134 
(17) Non-crisis: ABSIh + Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh -0.519 -1.178 -0.958 14.475 -0.780 20.498 
(18) Crisis - Non-crisis -0.060 -0.996 0.631 -15.722 0.044 -21.632 
(19) Crisis: Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh -0.472 -2.067 ∗∗∗ -0.259 -1.240 -0.611 -1.037 
(20) Non-crisis: Aftea x ABSIh + Aftea x delists x ABSIh 0.150 -0.505 -0.343 14.928 -0.140 20.912 
(21) Crisis - Non-crisis -0.622 -1.562 0.084 -16.168 -0.471 -21.949 
Panels A and B report relevant comparisons of coefficient estimates using the SUR regression results (as in Table 4 ) for the crisis (2007 – 2009) and non-crisis (2010 –
2013) periods for testing hypotheses H3 Crisis and H4 Crisis . Section 4.4 provides a discussion of related hypotheses and connections to table rows. Columns report estimates 
for the full sample (as in Table 4 ) as well as for the following subsamples: stock price of at least $1/share, average daily trading volume (“ADV”) of at least $50 0 0, market 
cap (“Size”) of at least $50 million, and total assets of at least $50 billion. The “Sweet spot” subsample consists of firms with market cap of at least $50 million and with 
total assets of at least $50 billion. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-sided Wald tests. 
firms, Table 6 Panel A Row (1) confirms robustly significant de- 
clines in abnormal short positioning during a crisis. However, Row 
(2) indicates the absence of a similarly robust decline during non- 
crisis times for survivors. The significant additional decline during 
crisis (Row 3) confirms H3 Crisis for surviving firms. 
Regarding H3 Crisis as applied to delisting firms, Table 6 Panel A 
Row (4) confirms a robust significant decline in abnormal short 
positioning during a crisis. In stark contrast, Row (5) not only re- 
flects an absence of a similar decline, but significantly increased 
post-announcement positioning in non-crisis delisting firms hav- 
ing sufficient remaining post-announcement market cap (e.g., Row 
(5)’s 4.075 ∗∗∗ for Size ≥ $50 M). Regarding H3 Crisis ’s specifically hy- 
pothesized difference, Row (6)’s significant additional declines dur- 
ing crisis (Full sample at -0.992 ∗∗ and negative and significant for 
all subsamples) confirm H3 Crisis even for delisting firms. In sum- 
mary, consistent with additional pressure for crisis-related profit 
taking to redeploy financial and human capital towards prospect- 
ing for pre-EA firms, both surviving and delisting firms in our sam- 
ple experience (on average) H3 Crisis’ s hypothesized greater decline 
in post-announcement short positioning during a financial crisis. 
Profit-taking is higher during a crisis. 
Regarding potentially important EA announcement feedback ef- 
fects, it is reasonable to conjecture that an EA announcement 
could act as a “wake up call” and thereby attract additional short 
seller capital and positioning, particularly in firms that subse- 
quently delist. Table 6 Panel A Row (5)’s positive coefficient esti- 
mates (post-announcement increases) are consistent with such a 
“wake up call” or “fear of missing out” notion for non-crisis delis- 
ters. However, Table 6 Panel A Row (4)’s uniformly negative coef- 
ficient estimates (post-announcement decreases) clearly contradict 
the notion of similar average post-announcement attraction for cri- 
sis delisters – even when post-announcement positioning remains 
significantly high ( Table 6 Panel A Row (7)’s 2.029 ∗∗ for Size ≥
$50 M and 1.6 6 6 ∗∗ for “Sweet spot”). Perhaps surprisingly, any on- 
average “piling on” in response to an EA appears to be a non-crisis, 
rather than crisis, concern, and only for delisters. In crisis, for both 
delisters and survivors, EAs usually offer short selling pressure re- 
lief. 
4.4.4. Does post-EA-announcement skill dissipate during a financial 
crisis ( H4 Crisis )? 
Regarding short sellers’ skill variations during a crisis, H4 Crisis 
hypothesizes that, due to greater competition during a crisis, there 
should be a less negative relationship between abnormal short in- 
terest following EA announcements and subsequent returns. As we 
highlighted in the discussion of H2 Crisis , Table 4 Columns (D) and 
(E) Row (1) indicates that the sign of the non-EA baseline relation- 
ship is negative in both Crisis (-0.107) and Non-crisis (-0.669 ∗∗∗) 
periods. 23 The significant difference from Non-Crisis (0.562 ∗∗∗) sug- 
gests that a crisis attracts, or induces, a lower level of cross- 
sectional allocation talent. Degradation in average skill is the ex- 
pected result of increased crisis-era entry and competition, and of 
the more informative prices at which short sellers engage even 
when there is no subsequent EA. However, H4 Crisis is a hypothe- 
sis specifically about lower relative positioning skill following EA 
announcements during crisis rather than non-crisis times. For sur- 
vivors, Table 6 Panel B Row (10) suggests less skill following EA an- 
nouncements (e.g., Full sample -0.0 6 6) in Crisis than in Non-crisis 
(e.g., Row (11)’s -1.015 ∗∗∗), the difference in which (e.g., Row (12)’s 
0.949) is consistently in the positive direction hypothesized in 
H4 Crisis . It is significant, however, only in the “Sweet spot” subsam- 
ple (Row (12)’s 2.195 ∗∗). In both crisis and non-crisis times, short 
seller cross-sectional allocation skill in survivors following an EA 
announcement tend to be comparable to that in firms that never 
receive an EA. (See Full Sample Row (13)’s 0.041 and Row (14)’s 
-0.346 which are both insignificantly different from zero.). A pos- 
sible exception is Non-crisis beyond-baseline post-announcement 
skill in surviving firms having sufficiently enticing remaining post- 
23 We emphasize again that the baseline’s forward-looking confinement to firms 
that never receive an EA biases the baseline negative measure of short seller talent 
up towards zero since EAs are generally considered negative events and firms that 
receive them in the future are excluded from this baseline. 
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announcement market cap ( Table 6 Panel B Row (14)’s -1.051 ∗∗ for 
Size ≥ $50 M and 1.879 ∗∗ for “Sweet spot”). However, given that 
our previous results have highlighted that positioning in delisting 
firms is the driving force behind greater measured short seller skill, 
the potentially more interesting comparison is again for delisters. 
Table 6 Panel B Rows (16) and (17) display similar overall delister 
skill following EA announcements (e.g., Full sample -0.579) in cri- 
sis as that in non-crisis times (e.g., Full sample -0.519). Row (18)’s 
overall negative differences for crisis delisters (e.g., Full sample - 
0.060) are insignificant but also in the opposite of the direction 
hypothesized in H4 Crisis . We note that, similar to survivors, Rows 
(19) and (20) reflect no significant overall evidence of other-than- 
baseline skill in either crisis (Row (19)’s Full sample -0.472) or non- 
crisis times (Row (20)’s Full sample 0.150). In summary, regarding 
H4 Crisis’ s conjecture of lower post-announcement cross-sectional 
allocation skill during crisis, Table 6 Panel B Row (12) presents 
consistently positive differences that align with H4 Crisis applied to 
survivors, only one of which is significantly different from zero. 
Table 6 Panel B Row (18) provides no consistent support for, nor 
contradiction of, H4 Crisis as applied to delisters. The only signifi- 
cantly beyond-baseline (truly abnormal) post-announcement skill 
is in Non-crisis surviving firms’ with large remaining market cap 
( Table 6 Panel B Row 14’s -1.051 ∗∗ and -1.448 ∗∗), and for Crisis non- 
penny-stock delisting firms ( Table 6 Panel B Row 19’s -2.067 ∗∗∗). 
While all subsamples presented in these rows (14 and 19) sug- 
gest beyond-baseline post-announcement skill, verification of the 
significance of potentially beyond-baseline skill awaits future more 
powerful investigations. 
5. Conclusions 
Formal EAs are important bank supervisory tools. Due to their 
public nature, however, bank and security market regulators, along 
with bank management, are justified in expressing concern regard- 
ing whether publicly-traded bank EAs – through information reve- 
lation and imposed restrictions – influence public equity values in 
a manner that interacts with regulatory intent. As an example, EAs 
can coincide with increased short selling and lower bank equity 
values thereby exacerbating efforts to restore regulatory capital ad- 
equacy. During times of financial crisis, almost by definition we ex- 
pect an unusually high number of EAs. Increased EA-related short 
selling across multiple banks could increase systemic risk. Given 
crisis conditions, to attenuate short seller feedback effects, bank 
regulators might favor non-public actions (e.g., MOUs) rather than 
publicly-announced EAs. However, Berger et al. (2021) find that use 
of formal EAs is important for reducing systemic risk, particularly 
during financial crises, and that “more severe EAs and EAs against 
banks are more effective in systemic risk reduction than those less 
severe” (p. 0). 24 
Our findings indicate that EAs correlate with a reduction in 
crisis-era short selling. Such a reduction adds another reason why 
crisis-era EAs may attenuate, rather than exacerbate, systemic risk. 
During the 20 07–20 09 financial crisis, following EA initiations, we 
find on average less short selling in firms operating with an EA 
than in comparable firms that never receive one. Our findings 
support our hypotheses that in financial crises, short sellers pre- 
dominantly position prior to EAs and that EA initiations then act 
as information-homogenizing and profit-taking events reducing in- 
24 Berger et al. (2021) do not examine short selling. 
centives to remain positioned. Profit-taking puts upward pressure 
on bank stock prices, all else equal. Extending our investigational 
approach to the period following the crisis, we document our per- 
haps otherwise counterintuitive main contribution: EA initiations 
attract short selling in non-crisis, rather than crisis , periods. So, 
while the possibility that EAs interfere with regulatory intent is a 
valid one, the concern appears to be justified primarily due to the 
reaction during non-crisis times. 
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